Introduction
Previous historiography has long recognized a link between growing maritime trade and the rise of the kingdom of Rahkaing
Rise ofa Mainland Trading State
In this paper, I will argue that the rulers of the Early Mrauk-U Dynasty (c.1430 Dynasty (c. -1603 ,5 in their efforts to gain regional hegemony, did not depend solely on maritime-derived resources but instead engaged in a complex program to develop the human, agricultural, and commercial resources of the Danya-wati river basin, while simultaneously restricting and controlling these same resources in outlying centers. The ability of Early Mrauk-U dynastic rulers to achieve both ends hinged partly on the stability of maritime trade and partly on the relatively limited ability of neighboring powers permanently to influence developments within the Rahkaing littoral. Further, the nature of the early modern maritime trade boom favored attempts by the Mrauk-U court to establish a monopoly over this trade. Early Mrauk-U dynastic hegemony within the Rahkaing littoral did not begin to unravel until the beginning of the 17th century, when changes in maritime commerce and encroaching influences from the northwest and east let loose pent-up centripetal forces.6
Development of Early Trade in the Rahkaing Littoral
The initial growth of 15lh-century maritime trade in Rahkaing had much to do with the development of contacts with Muslim trade centers elsewhere in Southeast Asia and in India. The Rahkaing littoral and Lower Myanma delta benefited particularly from the establishment, early in the 15th century, of Melaka, whose role as both commercial entrepot and Muslim sultanate helped foster the development of trade routes between the Muslim ports of eastern India and the Straits of Melaka. Throughout the 15th and 16th centuries, communities of Muslim and other traders in the Rahkaing littoral and in Lower Myanma owed their existence partly to their position midway along these trade routes. 7
While the potential benefits of Muslim trade connections may have been well known to rulers throughout Danya-wati, Nara-meikhla (r. 1404-1434), founder of the town of Mrauk-U and of the Mrauk-U Dynasty, was apparently the first ruler in Rahkaing actively to seek connections with Muslim India. This attempt may have been inspired by previous contacts with Muslim traders (perhaps fostered by Danya-wati's position as a major outlet for rubies from Awa [Ava] ), but a more certain factor was the fall of the Laun-kret Dynasty, which left other major centers in the Rahkaing littoral, such as Thantwei (Sandoway), under the control of the Muns (Mons) and therefore effectively eliminated as potential indigenous rivals for the Muslim trade.8 In any case, once the Muslim commercial connection was established, Mrauk-U sought to monopolize the resources necessary to its development. In exchange for the Muslim court of Bengal's support in establishing Mrauk-U control of the Danya-wati river basin region, Nara-meik-hla and his successors accepted nominal Muslim vassalage and the trappings of Muslim sultanship.9 Early Mrauk-U dynastic rulers in this way became the chief patrons of Islamic culture in the region, and 7 In the 1430s, some Muslims who accompanied Nara-meik-hla on his return from Bengal built at Mrauk-U a mosque called the Santikan. See E. Perhaps the component of the Islamic commercial connection that most enhanced the Danya-wati river basin's authority in the Rahkaing littoral was access to Muslim firearms. Generally, warfare in early modern Southeast Asia consisted of armies of elephants, horses, and warriors armed with spears, bows and arrows, and often warboats. Firearms, while generally not altering traditional styles of combat, often discouraged continued resistance by opponents who were not equally armed. In many cases, the daunting sight and explosive sounds of firearms were often sufficient in themselves to frighten off armies not yet introduced to such weapons. But most importantly, firearms increased the tactical advantage of Mrauk-U armies by increasing the physical distance from and the accuracy with which they could inflict casualties on an opponent, and by enhancing the defensive strength of Rahkaing fortified towns, especially the royal capital at Mrauk-U.11 For example, after extending the town, digging the reservoirs, and rebuilding the walls, Mìn-ba-krì filled it with muskets, cannon, and mortars, all likely of Muslim origin. These preparations helped Mrauk-U repulse a Portuguese attack in 1534.12 Ta-bin-shwei-hti's attacks on Thantwei in 1545 and Mrauk-U in 1546 likewise failed when his forces were repulsed with cannonfire.13
Muslim connections and increasing royal access to commercial revenues also made it possible for early Mrauk-U rulers to hire Muslim mercenaries, most of whom came, apparantly, from eastern India, particularly Bengal14 and, beginning in the late 16th century, Mrauk-U rulers to bring rival centers into submission, increase control over centers already under subjugation, and discourage hill tribes from engaging in debilitating raids. Firearm-bearing troops were concentrated in the Danya-wati river basin and in outlying centers at the coastal frontiers, thus strengthening central authority over the most distant royal holdings while simultaneously denying other major centers within the Rahkaing littoral access to such firearms.
As maritime trade became increasingly centered on Mrauk-U,17 so too did trade in commodities from the interior hill areas (a notable source of musk and rubies18) and Upper Myanma. The coastal ports in a better position to vend their own produce, and they could also function as affluent bottlenecks in the flow of commodities from inland areas to external markets. Trade between Rahkaing and Myanma in particular was subject to change in response to political disunity in the latter region, as occurred during those periods when Upper and Middle Myanma were isolated from the coasts by hostile Lower Delta kings. In the 15th century, for example, the Upper Myanma ruby trade was re-routed over the Rahkaing Yoma as a result of ongoing conflicts between Awa and Hantha-wati, only to be reverted back through the Lower Myanma Delta when armed conflicts between Rahkaing and Myanma arose along the ruby-trade route in 1469 19 and warfare between the Myanma north and the Mun (Mon) south died out in the latter part 15Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, lib. 16See Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Sadan, lib. A contingent of six hundred Muslim mercenaries, for example, was reduced to ten men after their boat sank in a storm during their passage to Rahkaing. See Guerreiro, Relaçâo Anual, 111:84. 17As Tomé Pires explains, Rahkaing "has a good port on the sea, where the Peguans, the Bengalees and the Klings trade .... The port is called Myohaung." Pires, Suma Oriental, 1:95-96. 18Pires says that these commodities were "the chief thing in the kingdom of Arakan." Pires, Suma Oriental, 1:96. v For unclear reasons, although perhaps in response to some unrecorded Rahkaing attempts to prevent Myanma traders from reaching Mrauk-U's maritime port, the Myanmas, led by the mró-zà (town-eater) of Salin, Thadokyaw, invaded Danya-wati via the An pass in 1469. The Myanmas withdrew after negotiations reached a presumably temporary solution. See Sanda Malalinkaya, 11:32. of the century.20 The Rahkaing Yoma routes were temporarily reestablished in the first decade of the 17th century when Awa again became sequestered from Lower-Delta ports by the Portuguese mercenary-cum-ruler of Than-lyn (Syriam),21 but after that the primary direction of Myanma trade seems to have settled to the south and remained so for the rest of the Mrauk-U dynastic period. Although there is evidence of Thantwei and Prei (Prome) maintaining religious and political connections over the Rahkaing Yoma in similar times of isolation from the coasts, I have found no evidence of significant levels of commercial exchange between these two centers.22
Commercial traffic in the Rahkaing littoral, now centered on Mrauk-U and Sittagaung (Chittagong), expanded as Portuguese traders entered the Bay of Bengal in the 16th century. Despite initial difficulties in establishing a mutually beneficial relationship, the early Mrauk-U kings actively sought out connections with the Portuguese.23 By the 1580s, the Portuguese and the Parsees, "using 20As Tomé Pires explained in the second decade of the 16th century, the hill peoples of the Rahkaing Yoma "bring musk and rubies to the great city of Ava . . . and from there they go to Pegu, and from Pegu they are distributed to Bengal, Narsinga and to Pase and Malacca." Pires, Suma Oriental, 1:96. 21The Rahkaing embassy to Awa in 1609 was preceded by Nyaun-yan-min's order to establish such a trade connection. As one account relates, Nyaunyan-min ordered to be built across the Rahkaing Yoma roads "along which five persons may walk abreast," this so that "trade goods could pass freely to and fro," thus allowing Awa to get "high-quality textiles from lands Guerreiro, Relaçâo Anual, 11:318. 22Judgement on whether or not this was due to Mrauk-U and Awan efforts to limit commercial intercourse, and thus to enhanced resources at either Thantwei or Prei, will have to wait until more evidence comes to light.
23See Cesar Fedrici's description of the Rahkaing king's efforts to bring ocean-going ships and boats," came to trade "yearly without fail."24 While 16th-century trading connections with Pei-hku (Pegu) were the king.28 This system was reconfirmed with each new monarch in a ceremony in which all vassals were required to swear loyalty to the new king. Of course, symbolic governance had its bureaucratic requirements: scribes were needed to record events and royal incomes; foreign mercenaries had to be paid; and centrally appointed officials or functionaries were gradually coupled with appanage grantees to reduce autonomy. But in general the early modern Rahkaing state functioned on a personal basis and may be accurately characterized, as other precolonial mainland Southeast Asia states have been, as a galactic polity whose structure is reflected in the figure of the mandala.
The viability of this political "system" depended on the degree to which the central ruler was able to sustain his magnetic aura of kingship, which in turn depended upon the proper functioning of a complex network of spiritual and material resource redistribution. The king's status as dhamma-raja, or chief patron, of Buddhism in the Rahkaing littoral was clearly demonstrated to outlying populations by local temple-and monastery-building programs. As the chief secondary center of cultural and commercial activity, Thantwei experienced the major proportion of Mrauk-U templebuilding activity outside the Danya-wati river basin. In 1604, Mìn-raza-krì reconstructed or repaired three great religious works at Thantwei-the San-taw, An-taw, and Nan-taw pagodas-and then re-donated four thousand Bengalis (they had already been donated once before).39 The Mahamuni shrine seems to have been especially revered. In 1430, the founder of the Mrauk-U dynasty, Nara-meikhla, built a road to the Mahamuni, to which place he subsequently promoted numerous pilgrimages.40 A more fundamental step was taken by Mìn-ba-krì, who in 1536 ordered that stone copies of the Mahamuni be set up in pagodas throughout Danya-wati.41 Another 32Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 21a; Kawithara (Monk of Dwara-wati), Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 1787, microfilmed palm-leaf manuscript, collected by the Burma Academic Expedition of Kagoshima University (japan), 55b.
33Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 54. 34Kulà, Maha-Razawin-kyi, 111:101. 35Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 52. 36Kawithara, Rahfang Razawin (Rakhapura), 54b. 37Sanda Malalinkaya, 11:32, 148; Kulà, 111:101. 38Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 14a; Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 52.
39Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 22a; Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 55b.
40Forchhammer, Report, 6. 41Forchhammer, Report, 7. separate means of demonstrating the king's religious status was through the reordination in Danya-wati of monks from throughout the kingdom, a practice that may have helped focus the monkhood's support on the central Mrauk-U ruler and thus initiated a rudimentary infrastructure for regional cultural and religious cohesion.
In his efforts continually to demonstrate that he above all others was the patron of Buddhism, the king sought to monopolize the material resources of the kingdom. Theoretically, everything in the kingdom-living beings and material objects alike-were the king's to dispose of at will. On a practical level, however, this dispensation was subject to the constraints of social sentiment and to the complex political arrangements through which secular control of the court and kingdom was forged and maintained. Victorious military commanders had to be rewarded to ensure continued successes and loyalty;42 potential heirs to the throne had to be assuaged with attractive appanage grants; and foreign clients and mercenaries had to be paid so as not to leave the kingdom or, worse still, support a rival claimant to the throne.43 Thus, in addition to being the chief patron of the Buddhist religion and the center of Rahkaing society, the Mrauk-U king served as the focal point of an important network of shared wealth.44 In this capacity, he monopolized for purposes of redistribution the bulk of commercial revenues and commodities, including luxury goods. When a war campaign proved successful, the spoils would be sent en toto to the king, who would proceed to redistribute many of them to the commanders and (sometimes) warriors of the campaign as well as to other important personages.45 At the top of this redistributive and 42See the discussion of this need in Tambiah, World Conqueror, 120. 43On the relationship between commercial revenues and the use of mercenaries, who, unlike regional levies, "joined central forces directly to the crown," see Lieberman, "Unification of Burma," 207. On the unreliability of such mercenaries, presumably when they could not be paid, see Victor The Journal of Burma Studies, Volume 3 13 trading arrangement, the status of the ruler was most aggrandized, while that of others was enhanced to lesser degrees commensurate with social distance from the king.
Mechanisms of Control over Outlying Centers
Rahkaing rulers altered titular relations between the Danyawati river basin and other major political centers in the Rahkaing littoral by replacing the indigenous ruling elite with progeny of the court of Mrauk-U and their retinues. As an example, prior to 1437 the ruler of Thantwei, while nominally subject to Mrauk-U control, retained sufficient autonomy to be considered a min (king) in his own right. As far as I can ascertain, the Thantwei royal family had no immediate connection, not even by marriage, with the ruling dynasty of Mrauk-U.46 They had for centuries been nominal vassals of the Danya-wati rulers, but this arrangement had not been reinforced or tested for a considerable period of time. After the direct acquisition of Thantwei by Mrauk-U in 1437, the local ruling family was removed to Mrauk-U and replaced by a Mrauk-U dynastic prince, and the Thantwei queen was married to the Mrauk-U king.47
Thereafter, Mrauk-U political control over Thantwei required authorization from two sources. First, there had to be titular relations with the Mrauk-U court. The title of the rulership of Thantwei per se was reduced from independent min to mró-zà 'town-eater' and remained so for the remainder of the early Mrauk-U period. This both reflected Thantwei's reduced significance as a potential rival of Mrauk-U and lessened the autonomy of the Thantwei court vis-à-vis other local and formerly less important political centers. Second, the mró-zfl-ship of Thantwei throughout the early Mrauk-U period was usually granted to the ein-shei-min (heir-apparent) of the central 46After Laùn-kret fell to the Myanmas, the yua-zà (village-eater) of Thon-yua (three villages) from the eastern country "established his rule over the town of Thantwei and then made himself min." See Sanda Malalinkaya, Rahkaing Razawin-thet-kyan, 11:21. The "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," however, holds that Ali Khan was the eater of Thantwei at the time of the Myanma invasion and that it was he who recaptured Mrauk-U. Upon his return of the throne to his brother, Nara-meik-hla, Nara-meik-hla made him the ein-shei-min (heir-apparent). See Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 42. Due to other discrepancies in the Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," which is a record of advice given by the great ministers to the Rahkaing king rather than a complete and detailed history of Rahkaing, I tentatively accept Sanda Malalinkaya's version. In any case, the effect of both versions is the same: the relationship between Mrauk-U and Thantwei was permanently changed. The other side of the political relationship between Mrauk-U and Thantwei was that it was difficult for the king of Mrauk-U to replace the ein-shei-min should the latter not act as desired. After a dispute in 1546, for example, Min-ba-kri took back the mró-zá-ship of Thantwei (and presumably the ein-shei-min-ship as well) from his younger brother Min-awn-hla. When Min-aun-hla appealed to the Myanma king Ta-bin-shwei-hti for help, the latter sent Bayin-naun with a large force to assist Thantwei in its contest with Mrauk-U. The campaign failed,50 but the threat it posed to the central court underscored the importance of a stable relationship between the Mrauk-U king and the mró-zà of Thantwei. When Sittagaung was brought under Mrauk-U central control in the late 15th century, governance was effected by coupling techniques followed in Thantwei with additional controls. Local administrative practices were replaced with Danya-wati-defined ones (the system of land measurement in Rahkaing drones, for 48See examples in Sanda Malalinkaya, 11:42, 57, 62, 66, 69, 78, 154; Anonymous, " 42, 46. 49Consider in this regard Min-kamaun's failed revolt against Thantwei, in which he sought to seize the throne of Mrauk-U and revitalize Danya-wati's resources, which had been depleted by a long series of military defeats under the incumbent, his father, Mìn-raza-krì. Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 22a.
50Kulà, Maha-Razawin-kyi, 11:211. Although Ta-bin-shwei-hti succeeded in seizing Laùn-kret town, his forces could not stand up against the fire of cannon and small arms from in front, Rahkaing attacks from behind, and the dearth of supplies after the mró-zà of Sittagaung's forces burned the fields of unharvested rice, upon which Ta-bin-shwei-hti presumably depended to feed his besieging troops. See Sanda Malalinkaya, Rahtäng Razawin-thetkyan, 11:71; Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 15a.
The Journal ofBurma Studies, Volume 3 15 example), and the Rahkaing calendar was adopted.51 Again, the local ruler was removed to the central court at Mrauk-U. In his place was appointed sometimes a low-ranking Mrauk-U prince but usually a minister not in line for succession to the throne.52 The lack of royal legitimacy or immediately recognizable claims to kingship reduced the potential for the rise of a competing royal center at Sittagaung.53 As a further guarantee, the central court effectively checked the mró-zà's authority by coupling it with that of a centrally appointed commissioner, or u-si, who commanded a garrison of firearmbearing troops. Without regalia, and with his own power reciprocally checked by the presence of the mró-zà, the u-si depended for his authority on the continued dominance of Mrauk-U over Sittagaung. To prevent the u-si from either forging a potentially dangerous alliance with the mró-zà or building a local power base of his own, his person and his garrison were rotated on a yearly basis.54 As yet a third check on the self-aggrandizement of the Sittagaung authorities, the early Mrauk-U kings granted considerable autonomy to the Portuguese trading communities around Sittagaung and nurtured their loyalty with royal stipends of up to thirty thousand Within a year of his appointment as the mró-zà of Sittagaung, Mìn-raza-krì's younger brother was removed from Sittagaung for tailing to support his kingly brother's authority in the region. See Anonymous, "Danya-wati Areitaw-poun," 114. Further, the most important and nearly successful rebellion of Sittagaung before the mid-17th century occurred in 1609, after Mìn-razakrì's younger son, who had been given the Sittagaung mró-zá-ship, rebelled with the help of Portuguese freebooters. See Manrique, 54In Sittagaung, the royal court assigned a new u-si each year from Mrauk-U. The new u-si was assigned a force of one hundred ships, as well as men and arms, and was then sent to Sittagaung. Upon his arrival at Sittagaung, the incumbent u-si, along with his ships and men, was sent back to the capital. See Jadunath Sarkar (trans.), "The Feringi Pirates of Chatgaon, 1665 A.D.," journal of the Asiatic Society ofBengal (New Series) 3(6): 421 (1907 Newly conquered areas whose long-term submission and loyalty was in doubt were placed under the control of nominal mró-zàs 'town-eaters' or krei-zàs 'settlement-eaters', who in turn were supported by sit-kès 'military commissioners' in command of the occupying warriors. After one successful expedition into Bengal, for example, the prince Nga-inga was made nominal mró-zà of the Bengalese town of Mauk-thuza and the surrounding region. Two sitkès commanded the Rahkaing forces stationed in the conquered areas, with the left-hand sit-kè, Mìn-kaun, governing the town of Dacca and the right-hand sit-kè placed at Mauk-thuza to guard the 55See Guerreiro, Relaçâo Anual, 1:44. 56Guerreiro says that in Sittagaung, the Portuguese were given nearly all of 
Demographics of Growth and Expansion
In time, commercial growth in the Danya-wati river basin and the centralization under Mrauk-U authority of military and political power in the Rahkaing littoral became self-promoting. Most important, these processes led to increased manpower reserves, the expansion of agriculture, and greater access to maritime-derived commerce, including the acquisition of firearms and mercenary services. Given Danya-wati's apparently small population (even when supplemented by commercial and military resources), Mrauk-U could not indefinitely extend its authority over outlying centers while at the same time preventing raids by hill tribes and invasions by the more populous neighbors to the north and east. The shortage of manpower was partially offset by Mrauk-U's early victories against other centers within the Rahkaing littoral, from which it transferred to the Danya-wati basin significant numbers of captive laborers. In the long term, however, other means were employed to help increase the level of available manpower, and these arrangements both resulted from and helped sustain the military, commercial, and political developments discussed above.
One likely boost to demographic stability and growth was a Although many of the Myanmas returned to their homeland once peace was restored there, some remained, as did most Muns. The affinities these groups shared with the dominant Myanma culture of s Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, Ub; Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 42.
64 Sanda Malalinkaya, Rahkaing Razawin-thet-kyan, 11:32. ffi Kulà, 111:60. 66 See an account of such an action in Kulà, Maha-Razawin-kyi, 11:189-193, 211-217, 111:60; Hmannan Maha-Razawin-kyi (Mandalay: Pitaka Sahout-daik-hsain, 1963), 11:229-230, 233-234. the region possibly aided their absorption into Danya-wati society, particularly in major centers such as Thantwei. Other perhaps less numerous refugees were garnered from Mrauk-U's maritime connections: expatriate Japanese Christians and Portuguese freebooters, for example, were clearly present by the early 17th century.68
Another concern of early Mrauk-U dynastic rulers was the eradication and sometimes absorption of hostile non-Rakhine tribes in the lowland and, more gradually, upland areas. Such tribes raided lowland villages, burned temples and towns, killed royal soldiers, looted, and above all took many lowlanders into captivity.69 Mrauk-U dynastic rulers throughout the 15th and early 16th centuries sought ways to end such raids. Sometimes, as with the Thets, the Mrón, and the Linkei,70local leaders were not replaced but were ® One such raid is described in Sanda Malalinkaya, Rah^ng Razawin-thetkyan, 11:64. Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 53b.
71See mention of a grant of Danya-wati regalia to vassal hill tribe rulers in
Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun,' 54.
72Sanaa Malalinkaya, 73Sanda Malalinkaya, 11:39. and regalia for his ministers.74 After several more uprisings, the Mrauk-U king, in addition to appointing yua-zàs over the Thet villages, reinstalled the Thet king with royal regalia and ordered him to set about making the "holy sasana ['religion'] ethnically Rahkaing.83 Considering that the chronicles do not specify how many "Rahkaing" soldiers were from non-Danya-wati areas such as Dwara-wati (which seems to have provided the bulk of the soldiers for this and subsequent campaigns), one can reasonably conclude that in eighty years' time the proportion of war levies from non-Danya-wati areas compared to those from within Danya-wati more than doubled.
Aside from providing the impetus for adding large numbers of conscript soldiers to Mrauk-U's armies, the raids into Bengal and Lower Myanma brought to the Danya-wati region large numbers of war captives. During times of extreme political dislocation in Lower Myanma, particularly in the 1598-1607 period, early Mrauk-U raids into Lower Myanma resulted in the acquisition of large numbers of Mun and Yòdayà families who were brought to Rahkaing and resettled as agriculturalists. Although the numbers given are so large as to suggest hyperbole, it is likely that the new settlers numbered in the thousands.84 Most appear to have been settled in villages in the Island.87 Some few of these groups were assigned to provide food to the monasteries, but most became involved in secular agriculture.88
Commercial Significance of Mrauk-U Military Campaigns
Aside from campaigns against Dacca, successful campaigns against hill tribes and lowland rivals within the Rahkaing littoral seem to have brought little wealth (although it did supply manpower) for redistribution. Campaigns in the late 1590s against Pei-hkù, however, were a different matter. While accounts of the value of war-booty taken from Lower Myanma towns such as Pathein (Bassein), Than-lyn, Makaw,89 and Pei-hku are probably exaggerated,90 it is likely that it was considerable.91 Gold, silver, textiles, and other goods taken both from Yòdayà armies and from Taun-ngu in 1600 also seem to have been sizable.92 As the Mrauk-U kings shifted their campaigns out of the increasingly secure Rahkaing littoral, acquired booty began to include significant amounts of gunpowder and firearms. In the early 16th-century campaign into northeast Bengal, the king ordered that aside from gold and silver textiles, only muskets, cannon, and ammunition would be demanded in tribute.93 The 1516 victory against Prei likewise brought a tribute of cannon, muskets, and other weapons.94 In 1600, the Yòdayà king sent three thousand cannon (pyaunmi-bauk) 87Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 116; Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 54b. 88On the donation of Muns in Kawithara, see Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 55b. 89At Makaw, the king gathered silver and other treasures. See Guerreiro, Relaçâo Anual, 1:47. 90Guerreiro says that the wealth left behind by the king of Taun-ngu after he Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 116. 92Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 116; Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 54b.
93Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 51. That supplies of firearms were gained from Bengal is also suggested by a notation in the Rahkaing chronicles according to which only the war levies from vassal areas, such as Bengal, came armed with muskets and firearms in the 1598-99 campaign against Pei-hkù. See, for example, Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-tawpoun," 115. See also Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 54a.
Anonymous, Rahkaing Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 15a.
in exchange for a Yòdayà prince (younger brother of the king) who had been captured in fighting on the Sittang in 1599.95
Finally, the expansion of royal control through the late 15th and 16th centuries brought increased access to new commodities that could be funneled into maritime trade. One could point, for instance, to the provisioning of deep-sea ships by outlying vassals, particularly the Bengali areas.96 Significant supplies of cotton and cloth entered Rahkaing markets from districts in Tippera adjacent to Sittagaung.97 From another perspective, one could suggest that increasingly secure lowlands and agricultural expansion within the Danya-wati river basin, made possible by increased labor inputs by the end of the 16th century, allowed Mrauk-U rulers to divert grain surpluses into maritime commerce. It is not until the early 17th century, for example, that one finds reference to exports of rice from Mrauk-U.98
Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined several factors involved in the rise of the Danya-wati-dominated Rahkaing kingdom. Rahkaing depended heavily upon maritime-derived resources for its expansion and control through the 15th and 16th centuries. However, it was the king's role as symbolic and material center that held the system together. Danya-wati's growth was enhanced by increasing security from foreign and hill tribe raiding and by manpower inputs gained through increasingly successful military campaigns, as it was by developments in 16th-and 17th-century Myanma, which supplied Danya-wati with commercial resources through trade with Upper Myanma and for nearly a century 95Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 116; Anonymous, Rahkain Mìn-raza-krì Arei-taw Sadan, 20b; Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 54b. These sources may actually refer to the 3,200 cannon the king had collected from the king of Pei-hku's fortress at Makaw in the same year. See Guerreiro, Relaçâo Anual, \·?7. 96Kawithara, Rahkaing Razawin (Rakhapura), 53b, 54a; Anonymous, Rahkaing 16a. 97Pires observed that in the 1510s, before Rahkaing had extended its control over the area, Tippera possessed an "infinite amount of cotton." See Pires, Suma Oriental, 1:90; See mention of the acquisition of textiles from Bengal in the early 16th century in Anonymous, "Danya-wati Arei-taw-poun," 51. 98As Methwold explained of the trading ships from Golconda, "[t]o Arrecan they send store of tobacco, some iron, and few sorts of painted clothes, and returne from thence some gold and gumme lacke, but most part rice, which they sell about Pallecat and that coast of Narsinga." See Methwold, "Relations of the Kingdome of Golchonda," in Relations of Golconda, [37] [38] Rise of a Mainland Trading State hindered the expansion of the rival center at Thantwei. Mrauk-U rulers were also able to enact policies limiting the commercial and demographic prospects for the potential rival center at Sittagaung.
Early Mrauk-U leaders solicited the loyalty of the dominant Rahkaing-Myanma population and conquered hill tribes, generally through the royal patronage of Buddhism and the exchange of centrally-defined regalia and other cultural equippage. It is uncertain whether Mrauk-U undertook a clearly defined program to integrate into Rahkaing society resettled war captives and other foreign groups, including Muslims and Europeans as well as Muns, Myanmas, Bengalis, and hill tribes people. Such cultural patronage was perhaps not needed in the 15th and 16th centuries, when the wealth and power derived from maritime trade minimized the threat of rebellion by non-Rahkaing groups, many of which were perhaps bonded to the Mrauk-U ruler as vassals and clients. Thus, with his continuing and increasing flow of maritime revenues, luxury goods, and firearms, the king held the disparate peoples of the Rahkaing littoral together as much by economic strength as by socio-religious status and patronage.
In any case, as a result of the growing stature of Mrauk-U in the mid-15th century, Danya-wati received increasing attention from neighboring and even distant polities. This was especially true as more frequent victories against kingdoms in Bengal, India, and Myanma brought not only white elephants but also high-ranking prize-queens whose royal lineages legitimize Mrauk-U dynastic rule in important outlying regions.99 Recognition by important foreign rulers also took other forms, such as requests for alliances and support from the royal houses of Prei and Taun-ngu.100 Perhaps even more important in this regard is the fact that by the mid-15th century, the Mrauk-U ruler and the Rahkaing kingdom were considered co-equal in status with the Awa ruler and the kingdom 99See examples of such prize-queens in Kulà, 
